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Fareed Zakaria’s international bestseller The Post-American World pointed to the “rise of the rest”—the growth of countries like China, India, Brazil, and others—as the great story of our time, the story that will undoubtedly shape the future of global power. Since its publication, the trends he identified have proceeded faster than anyone could have anticipated. The 2008 financial crisis turned the world upside down, stalling the United States and other advanced economies. Meanwhile emerging markets have surged ahead, coupling their economic growth with pride, nationalism, and a determination to shape their own future.

In this new edition, Zakaria makes sense of this rapidly changing landscape. With his customary lucidity, insight, and imagination, he draws on lessons from the two great power shifts of the past 500 years—the rise of the Western world and the rise of the United States—to tell us what we can expect from the third shift, the “rise of the rest.” The great challenge for Britain was economic decline.

The challenge for America now is political decline, for as others have grown in importance, the central role of the United States, especially in the a

scendant emerging markets, has already begun to shrink. As Zakaria eloquently argues, Washington needs to begin a serious transformation of its global strategy, moving from its traditional role of dominating hegemon to that of a more pragmatic, honest broker. It must seek to share power, create coalitions, build legitimacy, and define the global agenda—all formidable tasks.

None of this will be easy for the greatest power the world has ever known—the only power that for so long has really mattered. America stands at a crossroads: In a new global era where the United States no longer dominates the worldwide economy, orchestrates geopolitics, or overwhelms cultures, can the nation continue to thrive?

Additional Books by Fareed Zakaria… 

By Fareed Zakaria

Karl Marx wrote that history repeats itself the first time as tragedy, the second time as farce. And the third time, he might have added, as North Korea. Just when you thought the place could not get any stranger, it did. In the past few weeks, this impoverished, isolated nation has tested a nuclear bomb, threatened a preemptive nuclear attack on the United States, abrogated the armistice that ended the Korean War and declared its intention to “rain bullets” on its neighbor to the South.

No one knows for sure what is going on. It is highly unlikely that these moves are being conceived and directed by Kim Jong Un, the young leader who succeeded his father, Kim Jong Il. North Korea’s military dictatorship has wedded itself to the third generation of the Kim dynasty, which now seems to serve mostly as a unifying symbol for its people. But it is unlikely that a 28-year-old with almost no background in politics or experience in government is conceiving and directing these policies. (He does appear to have free rein on basketball policy in the hermit kingdom.)

The most likely explanation for North Korea’s actions is that it is trying to get attention. In the past, its provocations usually led to international (especially American) efforts to defuse tensions. Then came negotiations, which led to an agreement of sorts, which the North soon cheated on, which led to sanctions, isolation and, finally, North Korean provocation again.

The pattern may be repeating — but it’s a high-stakes game, with nuclear weapons, brinkmanship and hyper-nationalism all interacting. Things could go wrong. The most important new development, however, is China’s attitude change. In a remarkable shift, China — which sustains its neighbor North Korea economically — helped draft and then voted last week for U.N. sanctions against Pyongyang.

For decades, Beijing saw Pyongyang as a historical ally. But now, a senior Obama administration official told me Wednesday, “We are clearly hearing increasingly levels of frustration and concern” from Beijing about North Korea. At a recent meeting of an important advisory body to the government, a senior Communist Party official, Qiu Yuanping, openly questioned whether to “keep” or “dump” North Korea and wondered whether to talk to the North or “fight” with it. Days earlier, a senior Communist Party analyst, Deng Yuwen, argued in an op-ed in the Financial Times that ­China should “abandon” North Korea.

Talk is easier than action. China has never imposed penalties or strictly enforced sanctions against its ally. Beijing’s reasoning is understandable. We tend to think about North Korea through the prism of two issues: nuclear weapons and human rights. But the Chinese have a more pressing concern — national collapse. If they were to push the North Korean government too hard, the regime could fall, leaving millions to seek refuge in China. Even more important, the endgame would be obvious: a unified Korea on South Korea’s terms, which would mean that Chinawould be bordered by a formal ally of the United States — one with about 28,000U.S. troops on its soil as well as nuclear weapons. You don’t have to be paranoid to worry about that scenario.

If the United States wants to deepen China’s commitment to tackling North Korea’s belligerence, it will have to address Beijing’s concerns. National security adviser Tom Donilon, who has been the administration’s chief interlocutor with the Chinese, could have a frank series of conversations with his counterparts in Beijing about a strategic plan for the Korean Peninsula in the event of a North Korean collapse. The United States would need to explain whether it would support getting rid of the nuclear weapons immediately, whether U.S. troops would remain in a unified Korea and what America’s relationship with the new Korea would be.

Henry Kissinger has outlined an interesting way to approach the matter. “The Chinese will not want to be seen as abandoning an ally or colluding withWashington in planning its demise,” the former secretary of state explained to me. “They know that there is now a real danger of an accident, incident or miscalculation on the Korean Peninsula. If that happened, there is a danger thatChina and the United States would end up reacting quickly, viscerally and in ways that might make things much worse — even lead to conflict. To prevent this scenario, we should propose serious strategic talks.”

Kissinger, who has spent more time talking to senior Chinese leaders than any other living American, says: “My instinct is that the Chinese are ready to have this conversation.” A senior administration official concurred, saying, “China wants stability but they now recognize that Pyongyang is the driver of instability on theKorean Peninsula.”

By Fareed Zakaria

Secretary of State John Kerry’s first foreign trip is an impressive swing through nine countries in Europe and the Middle East. But I wonder if he should instead have visited just two countries, China and Japan. That’s where the most significant and dangerous new developments in international relations are unfolding. The world’s second- and third-largest economies have been jostling for months over territory, reviving ugly historical memories and making clear that, in the event of a crisis, neither side will back down. Trade between the two countries — which usually hovers around $350 billion a year — is down substantially. An accident, miscalculation or unforeseen event could easily spiral out of control.

All this is happening in the context of a China that is changing, internally and externally, one that lacks a deep and strategic relationship with the United States. In fact, the lack of progress in relations with China stands as the largest vacuum in President Obama’s generally successful foreign policy.

This has not been for lack of effort. The Obama administration came into office determined to make Asia a priority, topped by its ties to China. Hillary Clinton’s first trip as secretary of state was to Asia, and she signaled that discussions with China would focus on large strategic issues and not get bogged down over human rights. The administration wanted to engage China as a partner of sorts. Zbigniew Brzezinski, known to be close to President Obama, speculated about the need for “G-2” — an ongoing dialogue between Washington and Beijing on the big challenges facing the world.

China’s reaction to these overtures was confused and muddled. Beijing worried that it was being asked to involve itself in superpower diplomacy, which would distract it from its single-minded focus on economic development. China wanted to protect its right to be considered a developing country so that, for example, it could continue to industrialize without too much regard for climate change. Some in the Beijing foreign-policy elite wondered if this was a trap, forcing their government to rubber-stamp decisions that would be shaped and directed out of Washington. Others saw the Obama administration’s overtures as a sign of China’s growing strength, convincing them that the best path for Beijing was to keep building up economic strength and bide its time.

As a result, Beijing’s response to the administration’s initial diplomacy was cool. At the 2009 Copenhagen climate change conference, it was even dismissive and combative, actively trying to oppose U.S. efforts to reach a consensus.

Meanwhile in Asia, many of the continent’s other powers had begun worrying about a newly assertive China. From Japan to Vietnam to Singapore, governments in Asia signaled that they would welcome a greater American presence in the region, one that would assure them that Asia was not going to become China’s back yard.

The Obama administration shrewdly responded with its “pivot” in 2011, combining economic, political and military measures, all designed to signal that the United States would strengthen its role in Asia, balancing any potential Chinese hegemony.

The result of the pivot, however, was to further strain relations with Beijing. Today China and the United States maintain mechanisms, such as the strategic and economic dialogue between senior officials, but they are formal and ritualistic. No American and Chinese officials have developed genuinely deep mutual trust. Beijing views the pivot as a containment strategy and believes that rising Japanese nationalism — tolerated byWashington — is responsible for the crisis in the East China Sea.

Japan does seem to be entering its own more assertive phase, for domestic reasons. But the larger shift lies in Beijing. China has become the dominant power in Asia.

Simultaneously it is going through economic challenges, as the heady growth strategy of prior decades faces obstacles, and a complex political transition. Elements of the Chinese establishment, such as the People’s Liberation Army, have wanted a tougher line toward the United States. The revelations about Chinese government-sponsored hacking of U.S.defense and corporate secrets fit into this general picture of China becoming more forceful and arrogant.

Whoever is to blame, the fact remains that the only durable path to stability in Asia is a strong relationship between the United States and China. The two countries are not always going to agree, but they need to have much better and deeper ties.

When he gets back from his trip, Secretary Kerry should start planning his next one, toAsia.

Obama’s plan to expand pre-K education is a step in a long catch-up game

By Fareed Zakaria

America has long been seen—by its citizens and the world—as the place where anyone can make it. And yet studies from the past two decades all point to a different reality. Economic mobility in the U.S. is low compared with what it was in times past and with current levels in many European countries and Canada. It is particularly sticky at the two ends of the economic ladder. Rich people rarely become poor in a ­generation—and the poorest seldom get rich. Despite the rags-to-riches myth, such stories are the exception. A comprehensive study by the Pew Economic Mobility Project documents that in the U.S. today, few poor people become even upper middle class.

That’s why President Obama’s proposal to expand early-childhood education is vitally important: the idea is to provide high-quality pre-K for 4-year-olds from families whose incomes are at or below 200% of the poverty line—that is at or below $47,000 for a family of four. Children born into poor or dysfunctional families must have pathways up, especially if they have the talent to succeed. And the more we learn about neuroscience, the clearer it becomes that the human brain develops much sooner than we had believed. Early stimulation and education can be highly effective.

Some of the criticism of Obama’s ­program has come from the usual ideological opponents, though this is a program squarely aimed at creating greater equality of opportunity, not outcome. Other critics share his goals but worry about the government’s track record in the area. Specifically, they point to Head Start, the long-standing program that provides early education to disadvantaged children. The Department of Health and Human Ser­vices released a study of Head Start in 2010, updated in 2012, that concludes that the program’s positive effects begin to fade within a few years. This has led many to call it a failure and urge the government not to throw good money after bad.

But critics are jumping to conclusions about a very complicated subject without really understanding the study—or the limitations of social-science research. In a June 2012 paper, three scholars from the University of Chicago and University of California, Davis, painstakingly explained why it is premature to reject Head Start. They note that many factors may have intervened to erode the early gains in scores, including sharp rises in single-­parent families, non-English-speaking households and severe health problems like childhood obesity and diabetes. They also noted that early education in public schools has been getting better, a trend that might explain why Head Start kids lose their advantage over non–Head Start kids. Most important, some studies show that though their test scores level out, children who have been through early education do better in their professional lives.

Look at the data from the rest of the world. A 2012 report from the Organisation of Economic Co-operation and De­velopment (OECD) concludes that early-childhood education “improves children’s cognitive abilities, helps to create a foundation for lifelong learning, makes learning outcomes more equitable, reduces poverty and improves social mobility from generation to generation.”

This conclusion is based on data from 34 rich countries, many of which out­perform the U.S. in educational achievement and—now—economic mobility. In many of these countries, 90% of 3-year-olds get early-childhood education. The OECD average for 4-year-olds is 81%. In the U.S., it is only 69%, and those children tend to be from middle- and upper-middle-class families.

European countries provide universal (or almost universal) general education and day-care programs that focus on whole-child learning, unlike American ones, which are often more limited and target only the poor. The U.S.—the government and private sector combined—also spends much less on ­early-childhood education as a percentage of GDP, ranking 24th of the 34 countries surveyed by the OECD, and has a higher-than-average ­student-to-teacher ratio. Additionally, America’s poor children suffer more than Europe’s from malnutrition, which has an effect on the ability to learn.

American government, working locally for the most part, set the pace for education in the past 150 years. By the second half of the 19th century, mass elementary education was the norm across the nation. It would take other industrializing countries three to four decades to catch up, write scholars Claudia Goldin and Lawrence Katz in their book The Race Between Education and Technology. “Human capital became supreme in the 20th century and America led the way.”

That lead is now gone. Head Start should be reformed to ensure its effectiveness. But Obama’s proposals will help the U.S. start to catch up in the great human-capital struggle that will define the new century even more dramatically than it did the last.

President Obama’s State of the Union address presented an expanded vision of smart government to create jobs and revive the economy. Yet he lowered his sights on the single policy that would both jump-start the economy in the short term and create the conditions for long-term growth: infrastructure spending. Having tried several times to propose infrastructure bills of around $50 billion — or just 0.3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) — the president further scaled back, proposing a “fix-it-first” plan that repairs 70,000 bridges falling down nationwide. This would apply a band-aid on America’s growing cancer of failing infrastructure. A 2009 study of all U.S. infrastructure by the American Society of Civil Engineers concluded that $2.2 trillion should be spent over five years to bring the nation’s roads, bridges, railway tracks, airports and associated systems up to grade.

Here are three crucial facts.

First, this is the big bang: It would be the most effective way to create good jobs. Private investment in commercial and residential real estate is still well below the historic norm. Unemployment in the construction industry is among the nation’s highest, hovering above 16 percent.

Second, it’s cheap: The federal government’s borrowing costs are lower than they are likely to ever be again. If you have to fix your decaying boiler, deferring maintenance is not fiscally prudent: The bill will be larger after the boiler explodes.

Third, this is an area where the federal government has a big role, one that Republicans have long embraced. In 1930, even as Herbert Hoover was trying to balance the federal budget, he urged large-scale expenditures on infrastructure.

The impact on growth from, for example, streamlining air-traffic control systems is obvious — bringing in more goods, travelers and tourists. But the United States also needs to connect many of its mid-size cities to the world market, cities that since the recession have been doing a lot of the heavy lifting in exports, job creation and economic growth. The United States needs new and expanded infrastructure to move more gas turbines from Charlotte (which Obama mentioned Tuesday), precision medical equipment and construction equipment from Illinois and Indiana, motorcycles from Milwaukee and more.

And yet, despite all this, infrastructure spending is politically dead.

Obama invited congressional Republicans to a private screening of “Lincoln,” hoping they would see compromise in action. (They refused.) Perhaps he should try to get them to watch the splendid new “American Experience” documentary on the making of the Panama Canal. One hundred years ago, the United States completed what was then the most expensive, complex and ultimately successful government program in human history. (The canal opened in 1914, but the final excavation ended in December 1913.) In his book “The Path Between the Seas,” historian David McCullough put the bill at $352 million, which was about five times the total cost of all the country’s land acquisitions to date — California, Florida, New Mexico, Alaska and Hawaii.

The French had tried to build the canal a few years earlier but, despite putting the builder of the Suez Canal, Ferdinand de Lesseps, on the job, they left in total failure. The American project’s first chief engineer quit after the first year. His replacement left as well. Only with the third did the project start moving. Yellow fever killed thousands of workers and caused others to flee in fright. The engineering challenges were immense and often seemed insurmountable. Media reports about the project were largely negative.

Then, in November 1906, Theodore Roosevelt visited the canal. It was the first time a president had ever left the boundaries of the United States. Roosevelt, a Republican, was determined that the project continue and be adequately funded. He turned his visit into one of the first great presidential photo ops. The journalist William Inglis wrote that “now that the President has gone to Panama, has seen that the work is progressing . . . the people are slowly awakening to the fact that our engineers and mechanics and laborers are making a success of the greatest and most difficult engineering feat in the world.”

Through sheer perseverance, the age-old fantasy of connecting the world’s two great oceans became a reality. The practical result was to cut travel time for goods and cargo between the east and the west by an order of magnitude, igniting an explosion of trade. Today more than 14,500 ships, and 244 million tons of cargo, pass through the canal annually.

What are we doing today that people, 100 years from now, will look back upon with pride?

Obama has a chance to use the will of the majority to break the deadlock

By Fareed Zakaria

One of the great political ­debates in Washington—and around the country—has been about whether Barack Obama is a highly partisan Democrat bent on a liberal agenda or a centrist searching for compromise. It’s still early in his second term, but he has recently made moves that seem to answer the question. Obama could easily choose a partisan strategy that would be politically effective: Don’t make deals with the Republicans on immigration or entitlement reform, and go into the 2014 congressional elections with those problems still live. A deal on either front would allow Republicans to share credit and, most important, take the issue off the table. With no deal, Democrats could campaign as the guardians of Medicare and advocates of immigration reform, both electoral winners. For this reason, some Democratic Senators have begun to make demands well beyond what Republicans can accept.

But Obama has chosen the second path. In late January, as soon as a group of Republican and Democratic Senators joined forces behind a unified approach to immigration reform, Obama signaled his support for it. And this week, in urging Congress not to allow the so-called ­sequestration process to force massive spending cuts, the White House said Obama’s budget proposals to House Speaker John Boehner were “very much on the table.” Those proposals include entitlement reforms that arouse immediate opposition from Democrats. Obama might be doing this because he wants to notch some legislative accomplishments and leave a legacy. Even if that’s the case, the strategy might be good not only for Obama but also for the country.

The real question is, Will anyone ­follow him? Is Washington so polarized and dysfunctional that it will not be able to find a way to pass any compromise package on these—or other—issues?

There are many who argue that Washington, rather than being broken, simply represents a country that is deeply divided. If so, the issues at hand should provide a useful set of tests. Thumping majorities of Americans support immigration reform. Some 72% say ­undocumented workers should be given green cards or citizenship. A similar percentage wants to give more visas to high-technology workers. A solid majority opposes the sequestration cuts. On gun control, large majorities favor some common­sense controls: 85% of Americans support universal background checks; 80% support preventing those with mental illnesses from buying guns; 58% and 55%, respectively, would ban semiautomatic and assault-­style weapons. Interestingly, even on energy policy, large majorities want more action. Seven out of 10 favor higher emissions and pollution standards; 69% want more funding for wind and solar energy.

In a large, diverse democracy, these are substantial national majorities. But will they translate into legislative majorities in Washington? If not, it suggests there is a real disconnect between the country and its capital.

In a recent set of posts on the Washington Post’s invaluable Wonkblog, George Washington University scholar John Sides argues that the problem with Congress is not gerrymandering, as so many (including Obama) have maintained. It is instead that the political parties have become more ideological, nudged in part by local party officials, who impose more-stringent litmus tests for candidates on spending, taxing and social issues. I would add to those factors the need for endless fundraising and today’s partisan media, which also feed this process, though I would not discount gerry­mandering. Many forces have created the current political system.

If Washington can tackle some of the outstanding issues facing the country, it could create a virtuous cycle. The American economy is recovering. The housing market is slowly re-emerging and will boom again as America’s population grows over the next few decades. The energy revolution is lowering costs for manufacturing while adding jobs in the energy sector. America’s financial sector is in better shape than those of most rich countries. And American households have rebuilt their balance sheets; our savings rate today is higher than that of frugal Canada. A new Congressional Budget Office report has deficits returning to precrisis levels in a few years.

We don’t need a grand bargain. Even moderate reform—on immigration, gun control, energy policy and (most difficult) the budget—would give a powerful boost to the country, beyond the specific economic impact. Politicians could demonstrate that they can actually govern. Everyone would get some credit. America would have found its center.

The chaos at the second anniversary of the Tahrir Square uprising is only the latest and most vivid illustration that Egypt’s revolution is going off the rails. It has revived talk about the failure of the Arab Spring and even some nostalgia for the old order. But Arab dictators such as Hosni Mubarak could not have held onto power without even greater troubles; look at Syria. Events in the Middle East the past two years underscore that constitutions are as vital as elections and that good leadership is crucial in these transitions.

Compare the differences between Egypt and Jordan. At the start of the Arab Spring, it appeared that Egypt had responded to the will of its people, had made a clean break with its tyrannical past and was ushering in a new birth of freedom. Jordan, by contrast, responded with a few personnel changes, some promises to study the situation and talk of reform.

But then Egypt started going down the wrong path, and Jordan made a set of wise choices.

Put simply, Egypt chose democratization before liberalization. Elections became the most important element of the new order, used in legitimizing the new government, electing a president and ratifying the new constitution. As a result, the best organized force in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood, swept into power, even though, on the first ballot, only 25 percent of voters chose its presidential nominee, Mohamed Morsi. The Brotherhood was also able to dominate the drafting of the constitution. The document had many defects, including its failure to explicitly protect women’s rights — only four of the constitutional assembly’s 85 members were women — and language that seems to enshrine the traditional “character” of the Egyptian family. It also weakens protections for religious minorities such as the Bahais, who already face persecution.

Some of its provisions ban blasphemy and insult and allow for media censorship in the name of national security. These are all ways to give the government unlimited powers, which the Muslim Brotherhood has used. More journalists have been persecuted for insulting Morsi in his six-month presidency than during the nearly 30-year reign of Mubarak. In November, Morsi declared that his presidential decrees were above judicial review.

In Jordan, by contrast, the king did not rush to hold elections (and was widely criticized for his deliberate pace). Instead, he appointed a council to propose changes to the constitution. The members consulted many people in Jordan and in the West to determine how to make the country’s political system more democratic and inclusive. A series of important changes were approved in September 2011. They transferred some of the king’s powers to parliament and established an independent commission to administer elections and a court to oversee the constitutionality of legislation.

The commission recently got its first use. The election was boycotted by Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood on the grounds that the changes were too small and that power still resided with the king. But 70 percent of eligible voters registered, and 56 percent turned out at the polls, the highest turnout in the region. Many critics of the king and government were elected; 12 percent of the winners were opposition Islamist candidates. Thanks to a quota the commission set, 12 percent of the new parliament’s members are female. King Abdullah II retains ultimate authority, but the new system is clearly a step in the transition to a constitutional monarchy.

Morocco has taken the same route as Jordan. It enacted constitutional reforms in 2011. In the elections that followed, Morocco’s Islamist Party won 107 of the 395 seats in parliament and formed a government. The head of this government, Abdelilah Benkirane, while a feisty critic of the West, has also spoken firmly about protecting the rights of minorities, explicitly including Jews, who he noted have lived in Morocco for centuries and are an integral part of the country.

The Arab world’s two largest experiments in democracy, Iraq and Egypt, have, unfortunately, poor choices in common. Both placed elections ahead of constitutions and popular participation ahead of individual rights. Both have had as their first elected leaders strongmen with Islamist backgrounds who have no real dedication to liberal democracy. The results have been the establishment of “illiberal democracy” in Iraq and the danger of a similar system in Egypt.

The best role models for the region might well be two small monarchies. Jordan and Morocco have gone the opposite route, making measured reforms and liberalizing their existing systems. The monarchies have chosen evolution over revolution. So far, it seems the better course.