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January 15, 2007
We Might 'Win,' But Still Lose
Everyone seems quite
certain that George W. Bush's new plan for Iraq is bound to fail. But
I'm not so sure. At a military level, the strategy could well produce
some successes. American forces have won every battle they have fought
in Iraq. Having more troops and a new mission to secure whole neighborhoods
is a good idea-better four years late than never. But the crucial question
is, will military progress lead to political progress? That logic, at
the heart of the president's new strategy, strikes me as highly dubious.
Administration officials have pointed to last week's
fighting against Sunni insurgents in and around Baghdad's Haifa Street
as a textbook example of the new strategy. Iraqi forces took the lead,
American troops backed them up and the government did not put up any obstacles.
The Wall Street Journal's Daniel Henninger concluded that the battle "looked
like a successful test of unified [American-Iraqi] effort."
But did it? Newsweek's Michael Hastings, embedded
with an American advisory team that took part in the fighting, reports
that no more than 24 hours after the battle began on Jan. 6, the brigade's
Sunni commander, Gen. Razzak Hamza, was relieved of his command. The phone
call to fire him came directly from the office of Prime Minister Nuri
al-Maliki, a Shiite.Lt. Col. Steven Duke, commander of a U.S. advisory
team working with the Iraqis, and a 20-year Army veteran, describes Hamza
as "a true patriot [who] would go after the bad guys on either side."
Hamza was replaced by a Shiite.
Joint operations against Shiite militias are far less
likely, and not only because of political interference from the top. Groups
like Moqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army don't generally start fire fights with
the Americans or attack Iraqi forces. Their goals are different, quieter.
Another U.S. adviser, Maj. Mark Brady, confirms reports that the Mahdi
Army has been continuing to systematically take over Sunni neighborhoods,
killing, terrorizing and forcing people out of their homes. "They're
slowly moving across the river," he told Hastings, from predominantly
Shiite eastern Baghdad into the predominantly Sunni west. If the 20,000
additional American troops being sent to the Iraqi capital focus primarily
on Sunni insurgents, there's a chance the Shiite militias might get bolder.
Colonel Duke puts it bluntly: "[The Mahdi Army] is sitting on the
50-yard line eating popcorn, watching us do their work for them."
So what will happen if Bush's new plan "succeeds"
militarily over the next six months? Sunnis will become more insecure
as their militias are dismantled. Shiite militias will lower their profile
on the streets and remain as they are now, ensconced within the Iraqi
Army and police. That will surely make Sunnis less likely to support the
new Iraq. Shiite political leaders, on the other hand, will be emboldened.
They refused to make any compromises-on federalism, de-Baathification,
oil revenues and jobs-in 2003 when the United States was dominant, in
2005 when the insurgency was raging, and in 2006 when they took over the
reins of government fully. Why would they do so as they gain the upper
hand militarily?
Administration officials claim that this time things
are different. The Maliki government, and the Shiite leadership more generally,
understand that they must crack down on militias and compromise with the
Sunnis. Why? In the words of one senior U.S. official-under instructions
to stay anonymous-because Shiite political leaders understand they no
longer have "unquestioning American support anymore, especially from
Capitol Hill." This suggests that the administration finally understands
that Bush's blank-check policy for the Iraqi government has proved totally
counterproductive. The one action that might be forcing the Iraqi leadership
to make some compromises has been the threat that Congress would force
a withdrawal of American support. One month ago, the White House was criticizing
Congress as being borderline treasonous for suggesting such a thing. Today
its strategy in Iraq rests on the fruits of that assertiveness.
Over the past three and a half years, the dominant
flaw in the Bush administration's handling of Iraq is that it has, both
intentionally and inadvertently, driven the country's several communities
apart. Every seemingly neutral action-holding elections, firing Baathists
from the bureaucracy, building up an Iraqi military and police force-has
had seismic sectarian consequences. The greatest danger of Bush's new
strategy, then, isn't that it won't work but that it will-and thereby
push the country one step further along the road to all-out civil war.
Only a sustained strategy of pressure on the Maliki government-unlike
anything Bush has been willing to do yet-has any chance of averting this
outcome.
Otherwise, American interests and ideals will both be in jeopardy. Al Qaeda in Iraq-the one true national-security threat we face from that country-will gain Sunni support. In addition, as American officers like Duke and Brady have noted, our ideals will be tarnished. The U.S. Army will be actively aiding and assisting in the largest program of ethnic cleansing since Bosnia. Is that the model Bush wanted for the Middle East?
